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In Becker v. IRM Corp. the CaliforniaSupreme Court held that
landlords are subject to strict tort liability. The Becker holding
stands in sharp contrast to traditional rules that granted landlords a broad immunity even from negligence liability when tenants or others were injured by defective conditions on the leased
premises. As this Article explains, however, Becker is not an unprecedented step into uncharted territory. Rather, it is the culmination of more than a decade of landlord strict liability decisions
in Californiaand the logical consequence of broader trends in the
common law of tort, property and contract.
INTRODUCTION

In April 1985 the California Supreme Court held in Becker v.
IRM Corp.1 that landlords are subject to strict tort liability. This
holding, coming from the court that has led the courts of this nation

in delineating the doctrine of strict products liability,' is sure to genCopyright a 1986, by Virginia E. Nolan and Edmund Ursin. Professors Nolan and
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1. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
2. See Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 229
(1981); Kalven, Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 189
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erate interest and controversy. The purpose of this Article is to place
the Becker decision in perspective. The need for this perspective can
be easily demonstrated.
Traditionally, special rules granted landlords a broad immunity
from negligence liability when tenants or others were injured by dangerously defective conditions on leased premises.' Thus, for example,
if a defective wall heater in an apartment caused a fire which resulted in personal injury, injured victims would have no tort recovery
against the landlord even if the landlord had reason to know of the
dangerous condition. The landlord would be immune from tort liability unless the injury was "attributable to (1) a hidden danger in the
premises of which the landlord but not the tenant is aware, (2)
premises leased for public use, (3) premises retained under the landlord's control, such as common stairways, or (4) premises negligently
repaired by the landlord." 14 Thus, the landlord in our example would
be immune from negligence liability even if he reasonably should
have known of the danger, if in fact he did not know of it. The protection given landlords from tort liability is well illustrated by a
unanimous 1931 decision of the New York Court of Appeals. In
Cullings v. Goetz,5 a decision authored by Justice Cardozo, the court
held that landlords are immune from liability even when injury is
caused by a breach of a covenant to repair the premises. 6 This ruling
restricting landlord tort liability is especially striking when juxtaposed with Justice Cardozo's 1916 decision in MacPhersonv. Buick7
exposing manufacturers to tort liability regardless of privity, and his
1931 decision 8 sanctioning strict liability for personal injury caused
by defective food products.
Not surprisingly, changes in landlord tort liability have occurred
even within the traditional framework. Thus in Putnam v. Stout,9
the New York Court of Appeals overruled Cullings v. Goetz and
joined the "modern trend of decision . . . toward holding the lessor
liable . . . where the landlord has breached his covenant to repair
(1965).
See W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS. R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
434-35 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON]; Browder, The Taming of a Duty-The Tort Liability of Landlords, 81 MICH. L.
REv. 99, 101-02 (1982); Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat
Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 Vis. L. REv. 19, 48-49.
4. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 392, 308 A.2d 528, 531 (1973).
5. 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931), overruled, Putnam v. Stout, 38 N.Y.2d
607, 381 343 N.E.2d 319, N.Y.S.2d 848, (1976).
6. The decision also noted an exception to its holding: "Liability has been enlarged by statute where an apartment in a tenement house in a city of the first class is
the subject of the lease." 256 N.Y. at 298, 176 N.E. at 398.
7. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
8. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105
(1931).
9. 38 N.Y.2d 607, 345 N.E.2d 319, 381 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1976).
3.
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.... ,"1o What is surprising about Putnam is that this decision came
only in 1976, and that the "trend" at that late date consisted of only
eighteen states.1 1
Three years prior to Putnam, New Hampshire had gone further
than New York, rejecting the entire traditional framework that limited landlord tort liability. In its 1973 Sargent v. Ross 2 decision, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that landlords are held to a
full duty of due care: "[A] landlord must act as a reasonable person
under all of the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to
others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of
reducing or avoiding the risk."' 3 Under Sargent, the landlord in our
wall heater example could be liable in tort if, acting reasonably, he
should have known of the danger posed by the wall heater-even
though he did not covenant to repair the heater and even though he
did not, in fact, know of the danger.
Sargent could be viewed as a dramatic rejection of the traditional
framework and extension of landlord liability. Indeed, it has been
recently reported that "[o]ther states have shown little enthusiasm
for this approach and continue to work within and expand upon the
traditional exceptions."' 4 From this perspective the strict liability decision of the California Supreme Court in Becker could be viewed as
an unprecedented and bold step into uncharted territory. Indeed, the
California Supreme Court itself had not previously held landlords
even to a full duty of due care.' 5 Under Becker, the landlord in our
wall heater example could be liable in tort even though the landlord
did not know or have any reason to know of the defect in the wall
heater, and even though the defect could not have been discovered
by inspection. Contrasted with the traditional rules of landlord liabil10. Id. at 616-17, 345 N.E.2d at 325, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 853. A landlord may also
be liable in tort when a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation has been violated.
A violation of a housing code is an example. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 285-288 (1965) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 17.6(2) (1977).
11. 38 N.Y.2d at 616-17 n.6, 345 N.E.2d at 325 n.6, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 616-17
n.6. See also M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES 181 (3d ed. 1983).
12.

113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).

13. Id. at 397, 308 A.2d at 534.
14. M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 11, at 182. Browder, supra note 3, at
155-56, concludes that a number of states-some construing statutes-have adopted a
negligence standard.
15. Becker so held. 38 Cal. 3d at 469-70, 698 P.2d at 125-26, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
222-23. Before the Becker decision only courts of appeal had held landlords to a full duty
of due care. See, e.g., Brennan v. Cockrell Investments, Inc., 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111
Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973). See infra text accompanying notes 99-124.

ity-and even with Sargent v. Ross-the application of strict tort
liability to landlords could be seen as extraordinary.
Yet something even more unusual was occurring. One year prior
to Sargent v. Ross, California courts had already imposed strict tort
liability on landlords. In 1972, a California court of appeal imposed
strict tort liability on a landlord for injuries caused by defective furniture leased with the premises.16 Three years after Sargent, in 1976,
another California decision imposed strict liability on a landlord
when a defective wall heater-a fixture-had caused injury. 17 Moreover, these developments were reflected in academic commentary. By
1982, it could be concluded that the "generally accepted notion" is
that strict liability applies to the personal property of the landlord
found in the furnished premises.1 " In 1983, a California court of appeal rendered its decision in the Becker case. 19 Because the California Supreme Court subsequently granted a hearing in Becker, the
court of appeal decision ceased having any precedential value under
California law.20 Nonetheless, the court of appeal opinion had suggested that the now decade-old strict landlord liability doctrine
would not be confined to products or fixtures. 21 In 1984, the new
edition of the Prosser hornbook, now the Prosser and Keeton hornbook, 22 was issued. Surveying the law of landlord tort liability, the
authors wrote that "[there seems to be growing support for the position that the nature of a realty lease, especially a lease of residential
premises and, even more especially, a lease of an apartment, is not
sufficiently different from that of a personal property bailment to
justify different rules of liability. '2 3 Thus, since strict liability is applied against lessors of products, the authors concluded "strict liability in tort [is] likely to become applicable as against that kind of
lessor or landlord who can be regarded as being engaged in the busi16. Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972). See
infra text accompanying notes 148-52.
17. Golden v. Conway, 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976). See infra
text accompanying notes 154-57.
18. Browder, supra note 3, at 122. See infra note 296.
19. Becker v. IRM Corp., 192 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1983) (Newsom, J.), vacated, 38
Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985). See infra note 20. Before depublication, the appellate court decision was reported at 144 Cal. App. 3d 222. See CAL. R.
CT. 976-978 (rules for publication of appellate opinions).
20. Under California law when an appeal is docketed by the California Supreme
Court, the court of appeal decision ceases to have precedential value. See Knouse v.
Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438 (1937). Judge Newsom's opinion for the court of
appeal in Becker was, however, subsequently adopted nearly verbatim by Chief Justice
Bird in her concurring opinion. See Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 470, 698 P.2d at 126, 213 Cal.
Rptr. at 223.
21. Becker v. IRM Corp., 192 Cal. Rptr. 570, 577 (1983), vacated, 38 Cal. 3d
454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985). See supra note 20.
22. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3.
23. Id. at 722.
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ness of renting apartments and other structures as part of his business as a realtor. 24 The following year the California Supreme
Court in Becker adopted the rule of strict landlord tort liability. 25
Thus, it is understandable that observers might be puzzled. On the
one hand, Becker could be viewed as an unprecedented leap into the
unknown-far more bold than the Sargent holding that landlords
owe a full duty of due care. On the other hand, Becker could be
viewed as the culmination of over a decade of common law development and academic commentary, almost reflective of hornbook law.
The purpose of this Article is to assist in understanding the doctrine
of strict landlord tort liability by placing Becker in context. We first
examine contemporary developments in the law of tort and property,
and we suggest how these developments point to the doctrine of landlord strict tort liability. We then examine the Becker decision in the
context of strict liability law and policy. We conclude that the
Becker holding that landlords may be strictly liable for injuries
caused by dangerously defective conditions on leased premises is not
an unprecedented step into uncharted territory. Rather, it is a desirable application of strict liability, supported by the decisions of the
past two decades.
CONVERGING LINES OF LAW AND POLICY

Strict Products Liability: Law and Policy
An obvious approach to the issue of landlord strict liability is from
the perspective of the strict products liability revolution that has
swept the courts of this nation during the past quarter century. 26
From this perspective, the question is whether the strict products liability decisions and their underlying policies mandate a rule of landlord strict liability.27 To understand the implications of existing strict
products liability law, one should start with the pioneering decisions.

.,

24. Id.
25. 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219. See infra text
accompanying notes 171-206.
26. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 722; Levy & Ursin, Tort Law
in California:At the Crossroads, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 497, 507 (1979).
27. The extension of strict liability beyond products has been the source of considerable academic speculation. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 88-89 (4th ed. 1984); Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence
and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963, 976 (1981); Kalven, Tort
Law-Tort Watch, 34 AM. TRIAL LAW. AJ. 1, 42-45 (1972). See generally Nolan &
Ursin, Strict Liability for Hazardous Activities, in CALIFORNIA TORTS 7-1 (N. Levy, L.
Sacks & M. Golden eds. 1985).

In his 1944 concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,2 8 proposing the doctrine of strict products liability, Justice Traynor laid
the intellectual groundwork for the articulation of the strict liability

doctrine. Indeed, in the landmark 1963 Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.29 decision, Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous
court, felt little need to discuss the basis of the strict products liability rule adopted in that decision, noting with a citation to his Escola
concurrence that it had previously been fully articulated. 30 Justice
Traynor's Escola concurrence, as well as subsequent California decisions, clearly establishes the policy rationale for strict products liability. These decisions emphasize the loss spreading policy-that
strict liability is desirable because "the risk of injury can be insured
by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of
doing business." 31 Strict liability is also viewed as an appropriate response when contemporary expectations of product safety are vio-

28. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
29. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
30. Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. See Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at
459, 698 P.2d at 118, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
31. Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). The loss
spreading policy articulated by Justice Traynor in his seminal Escola concurring opinion
has now been widely accepted as a justification for strict products liability. See, e.g.,
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 692-93; Ursin, supra note 2, at 301-03. The loss
spreading rationale has been expressly reiterated by California Supreme Court justices in
leading tort decisions and opinions. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 26 Cal.
3d 588, 610-12, 607 P.2d 924, 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-45 (Mosk, J.) (imposing
industry-wide liability for drug DES), cert. denied sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v.
Sindell, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 736-37,
575 P.2d 1162, 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386-87 (1978) (Richardson, J.) (applying
comparative fault to strict products liability); Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 30-34,
560 P.2d 3, 8-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579-82 (1977) (Wright, C.J.) (making successor
corporation liable); Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 765-66, 478 P.2d 465, 46970, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749-50 (1970) (Tobriner, J.) (shifting burden of proof on causation to defendant); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 248, 466 P.2d 722, 723, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 178, 179 (1970) (Sullivan, J.) (extending strict liability to commercial bailors);
Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 420, 426 P.2d 525, 540, 58 Cal. Rptr. 125, 140 (1967)
(Tobriner, J., concurring) (proposing strict liability rule for specified accidents during
medical treatment); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 21, 403 P.2d 145, 152-53,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24-25 (1965) (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing for applicability of strict liability to economic harm); Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 62-63, 377 P.2d at
900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (Traynor, J.) (adopting strict products liability). See also
Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach Sch. Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 525, 585 P.2d 851, 861, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 11 (1978) (Clark, J., dissenting) (lamenting role of loss spreading policy).
The loss distribution goal, if followed to its logical conclusion, suggests mechanisms for
dealing with accident losses that would obviate the need for tort law. See P. ATIYAH,
ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 486-95, 561-77 (2d ed. 1975); G. CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 46 (1970). Indeed, New Zealand recently has replaced its tort
system with a comprehensive social insurance system for accident compensation. See generally Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The First 7wo Years, 25 Am. J.
CoMP. L. 1 (1977). Courts, however, have relied on this policy to move tort doctrine
away from its nineteenth-century bias against compensation and into conformance with
contemporary values. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1069-70 n.5 (1956).
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lated by a product defect. 2 Finally, strict liability of manufacturers
is seen to create desirable economic incentives for product safety. 33
Decisions emphasize that public policy "demands that responsibility
be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards of life
and health inherent in defective products that reach the market. 34
These policy themes have justified the extension of strict products
liability to retailers3 5 and to lessors 6 of products. Allowing a strict
liability cause of action against a retailer can be viewed, for example, as an alternative to manufacturer liability in order to honor expectations of safety.37 Similarly, the safety incentive rationale has
also justified retailer strict liability.38 Justice Traynor, in the leading

32. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429, 573 P.2d 443, 455,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978). See generally Shapo, A Representational Theory of
Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974).
33. See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 129, 501 P.2d 1153,
1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 439 (1972); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,
262-63, 391 P.2d 168, 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964); see also Sindell, 26
Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (safety incentives justify reducing
plaintiff's burden of proving cause-in-fact). This posture toward the safety incentive effects of strict liability is in large part consistent with the economic analysis of Professor
Calabresi. See, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test of Strict Liability in Torts,
81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972). Courts, however, appear not to have relied heavily on technical economic analysis in their development of strict liability rules. See Traynor, The
Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363,
366 (1965). Moreover, contemporary economic theory does not supply definitive answers
regarding the safety incentive effects of strict liability, as opposed to negligence, rules.
Compare Calabresi & Hirsehoff, supra, with Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 205, 221 (1973). For views skeptical of economic analysis, see Horwitz,
Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980); Gilmore,
Product Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 103 (1970).
Another justification advanced for strict liability is that, even when present, negligence
may be difficult to prove. See, e.g., Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 467, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor,
J.,
concurring). The difficulty of proving negligence may, in turn, be seen to support the
safety incentive argument for strict liability. A realistic view of the tort system suggests
that a negligence standard often will not result in liability even when negligence, in fact,
exists. Thus, in practice, strict liability is better suited to creating incentives for safety.
See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra at 1060; Ursin, Strict Liability for Defective Business
Premises: One Step Beyond Rowland and Greenman, 22 UCLA L. REv. 820, 829-30
(1975). See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 693.
34. Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 129, 501 P.2d at 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 439 (quoting
Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 440 (Traynor, J.,concurring)).
35. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
36. See, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178 (1970); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769
(1965).
37. Shapo, supra note 32, at 1244-45.
38. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 707.

Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. 39 decision, explained that "the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer's strict liability thus serves as an added
incentive to safety."' 40 Finally, the loss spreading policy is also served
by strict liability. For a variety of reasons, including insolvency or
41
lack of jurisdiction, the manufacturer may not be amenable to suit.
As Justice Traynor pointed out in Vandermark, "the retailer may be
the only member of [the overall producing and marketing] enterprise
reasonably available to the injured plaintiff. '42 Thus "[s]trict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured plaintiff . . .-.
The same policy themes have been applied to the issue of strict
liability of lessors of products. Expectations of safety are recognized,
safety is encouraged, and losses are spread by imposing strict liability on lessors of products. 44 Thus the California Supreme Court, in
Price v. Shell Oil Co.,45 concluded that there is "no significant difference between a manufacturer or retailer who places an article on
the market by means of a sale and a bailor4' or
6 lessor who accomplishes the same result by means of a lease."
The issue of landlord strict liability could be approached by asking
whether these products liability holdings and statements of strict liability policies point to such a doctrine. The question could be posed
as whether strict liability policies can be confined to products cases
and the applications of strict liability spawned by these cases. In
other words, do tenant expectations,47 and safety incentive48 and loss
spreading 49 considerations, point to a rule of landlord strict tort liability, under which tenants or others injured by the dangerously defective condition of leased premises would be awarded compensation
39. 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
40. Id. at 262, 391 P.2d at 171-72, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
41. Id.; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 706.
42. Cal. 2d at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
43. Id.
44. In Price v. Shell Oil Co., the court reasoned that lessors "are able to bear the
cost of compensating for injuries resulting from defects by spreading the loss through an
adjustment of the rental." 2 Cal. 3d at 252, 466 P.2d at 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
Moreover, "the imposition of strict liability upon [the lessor] serves . . . as an incentive
to safety." Id. at 252, 466 P.2d at 727, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 183. The court concluded that
"the paramount policy to be promoted by the [strict products liability] rule is the protection of otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the spreading
throughout society of the cost of compensating them." Id. at 251, 466 P.2d at 725-26, 85
Cal. Rptr. at 181-82. See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 722.
45. 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970). See infra notes 13234 and accompanying text.
46. 2 Cal. 3d at 253, 466 P.2d at 727, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 143-44.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 145-46.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 147 & 199.
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even absent proven landlord negligence? Similarly, analogies between strict products liability holdings and landlord cases could be
analyzed. 0 If, for example, strict liability applies to retailers and lessors of furniture, does it also apply to a landlord who leases furniture
in conjunction with his renting of apartments? If so, the next question would be whether strict liability applies where the defective
product is a fixture in the leased apartment. Then, of course, would
be the issue of structural defects in the leased premises. It would be
a mistake, however, to view the issue of landlord strict liability solely
from these strict products liability perspectives. Equally relevant are
the law and policies governing the relationship between landlords
and tenants.
Landlord and Tenant: Law and Policy
Judicial Reform of the Law of Landlord and Tenant: The
Implied Warranty of Habitability
At common law the lease was viewed not as a contract but as a
conveyance of property. 51 As a result, the law treated tenants
harshly and afforded them few rights in their relationship with landlords. As a conveyance of property, the lease was governed by the
doctrine of caveat emptor. The landlord owed no duty to place the
leased premises in a habitable condition, and had no obligation to
repair the premises.52 Moreover, even if the lease contained an express or implied covenant to repair, that covenant was independent
of the tenant's covenant to pay rent. Thus, even if a landlord expressly covenanted to make repairs, the lessee was3 not entitled to
withhold rent upon breach of the lessor's covenant.
The "balance" which the traditional common law struck between
the rights of landlords and the rights of tenants might conceivably
have been justified in the context of the agrarian society in which
this common law developed-a society in which the land itself was
the most important element in a lease transaction."s In recent years,
however, courts have reconsidered this body of law in the context of
50. See infra text accompanying notes 148-70.
51. Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 622, 517 P.2d 1168, 1171-72, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 707-08 (1974). See generally Browder, supra note 3, at 99-109; Love, supra
note 3, at 22-37, 48-91.
52. See, e.g., Brewster v. DeFremery, 33 Cal. 341 (1867). See generally Browder,
supra note 3, at 99-109.
53. See, e.g., Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 145, 146 P. 423 (1915).
54. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 622, 517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708.

contemporary residential leases. Measured by contemporary values,
the traditional rules have proved wanting, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1970 recognized the concept of the implied warranty of habitability in Javins v.
First National Realty Corp. 5 In 1974, the California Supreme
Court-well into its reformation of products liability doctrine-joined the "growing number of courts [that] have begun to
reexamine [the] 'settled' common law [landlord-tenant] rules in light
of contemporary conditions .

. . ."5

In Green v. Superior Court,5"

this reexamination resulted in the conclusion that the traditional
common law rules were "a product of an earlier, land-oriented era,
which bears no reasonable relation to the social or legal realities of
the landlord-tenant relationship of today."58 Noting that "comprehensive housing codes affirm that . . . public policy compels land-

lords to bear the primary responsibility for maintaining safe, clean
and habitable housing in our state . . . ,"5 the court held that a

warranty of habitability is implied by law in residential leases.6 0
Under this warranty, "a residential landlord covenants that premises
he leases for living quarters will be maintained in a habitable state
for the duration of the lease."61 In addition, the court held that the
duty of the tenant to pay rent is dependent upon the landlord's fulfillment of this implied warranty of habitability. Thus, a tenant may
raise the breach of an implied warranty of habitability by a landlord
as a defense in an unlawful detainer proceeding.62
The most striking aspect of the Green decision is how strongly it
supports the tort doctrine of landlord strict liability. In Green the
court analogized the modern urban tenant to the consumer of goods,
noting that in "most significant respects, the modern urban tenant is
in the same position as any other normal consumer of goods."6 3 Realistically, the tenant through a residential lease "seeks to purchase
'housing' from his landlord for a specified period of time [and the]
landlord 'sells' housing ...."61 A lessor has, as does a manufacturer, "a much greater opportunity, incentive and capacity than a
tenant to inspect and maintain the condition of his apartment building."6 5 Moreover, the reasonable expectations of safety associated
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 623, 517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
Id. at 616, 517 P.2d at 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
Id. at 639, 517 P.2d at 1184, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
Id. at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
Id. at 637, 517 P.2d at 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
Id.
Id. at 631, 517 P.2d at 1178, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
Id. at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
Id.
Id.
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with consumers of products 6 also mark the lessor-lessee relationship.
A tenant may reasonably expect that the product he is purchasing is fit
for the purpose for which it is obtained, that is, a living unit . .

.

. [and]

the tenant may legitimately expect that the premises
87 will be fit for such
habitation for the duration of the term of the lease.

Thus, the court in Green wrote that it "is just such reasonable expectations of consumers which the modern 'implied warranty' decisions
endow with formal, legal protection." 68
Green's analogy of the modern urban tenant to the consumer of
goods is sound, as is its protection of tenants by an implied warranty
of habitability. The analogy, however, is incomplete. When the modern consumer is injured by a defective product, he or she has a strict
tort liability remedy.6 9 By analogizing the tenant to the consumer of
goods, the Green decision thus suggests a doctrine of strict landlord
tort liability, under which persons injured by defective conditions on
leased premises would have a strict tort liability cause of action
against the landlord. Moreover, the Green decision's emphasis on the
capacity of landlords to insure the safety of leased premises and its
recognition of expectations of safety are analogous to the concerns
that led courts to recognize the doctrine of strict tort liability for
defective products. Because manufacturers, retailers and lessors of
products have the capacity to insure product safety, and because
consumers have reasonable expectations of product safety, strict tort
liability has been applied to protect against injuries caused by defects in products.7 1 In the context of leased premises, these safety
considerations suggest that persons injured by defective conditions
on leased premises, like persons injured by defective products, should
be protected by a rule of strict tort liability.
Another interesting aspect of the Green decision is found in the
court's discussion of the protection afforded consumers by the implied warranty of fitness and merchantability. The citation of authority by the court for this implied warranty recognizes that a breach of
the warranty provides a strict liability cause of action for personal
66.
67.

See supra note 32.
Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175,

ll Cal. Rptr. at 711.

68. Id.
69. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d
897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963). The consumer may also recover under an implied warranty theory. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960) (implied warranty recovery extended to plaintiffs not in privity with defendant manufacturer).
70. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.

injury. The court cited Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co.,71 a 1939 decision holding that the implied warranty of fitness extended to the
plaintiff who became ill by eating a sandwich which was manufactured by the defendant and subsequently sold through a restaurateur
to the plaintiff. It also cited Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co.,72 a 1960
decision which held a manufacturer liable for personal injury caused
by a defective grinding wheel which the manufacturer had sold to
the plaintiff's employer. Most telling, the court cited Justice Traynor's Escola73 concurrence, which explained that the warranty decisions were in fact better viewed as strict tort liability. 4 The implied
warranty decisions cited in Green had in fact been-as the Green
court knew-the precursors to the doctrine of strict tort liability for
defective products. 5 Thus, the reasoning and methodology of the
Green decision strongly suggest that the implied warranty of habitability should be viewed as the precursor to a doctrine of strict tort
liability of landlords. Indeed, a decade prior to Green the California
Supreme Court had recognized that personal injury presents a more
compelling case for legal protection than does pure economic loss. 6
Thus, the economic remedies afforded tenants under Green, such as
rent withholding, dramatize the desirability of strict landlord tort liability for personal injury caused by defects on the premises.
Landlord Tort Liability
The same imbalance between the rights of landlords and the rights
of tenants that characterized the pre-Green law with respect to the
habitability of leased premises also characterized the traditional
rules of landlord tort liability. Under traditional tort rules a landlord
enjoyed a broad immunity from tort liability.77 Exceptions to this
broad imthunity evolved slowly 78 but still left landlords free of a gen71. 14 Cal. 2d 272, 276-83, 93 P.2d 799; 801-04 (1939), cited with approval in
Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 626, 517 P.2d at 1174, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
72. 54 Cal. 2d 339, 341-48, 353 P.2d 575, 577-81, 5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 865-69
(1960), cited with approval in Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 626, 517 P.2d at 1174, Ill Cal.
Rptr. at 710.
73. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring), cited with approval in Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 626, 517 P.2d at
1174, Ill Cal. Rptr. at 710.
74. 24 Cal. 2d at 464, 150 P.2d at 442.
75. See Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 57, 377 P.2d at 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
76. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 23 (1965). For further discussion of Seely and economic loss, see Schwartz,
Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J'Aire and of Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37 (1986).
77. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 434-35; Browder, supra note 3, at
99; Love, supra note 3, at 19.
78. For example, Justice Cardozo's 1931 opinion in Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N.Y.
287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931), held that a landlord's contractual assumption of responsibility
to repair did not create a tort duty. The decision was not overruled until 1976. See Put-
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eral duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain safe premises. 79
Just as a tenant at common law could not withhold rent when a
landlord failed to maintain the leased premises in habitable condition,80 a tenant would also be unlikely to have a tort cause of action
should he be injured by a dangerous defect in the premises.
Justice Cardozo's opinion in Cullings v. Goetze l illustrates the
conceptual framework employed by courts to justify the traditional
rules restricting tort recovery. In ruling that a covenant to repair
does not impose tort liability upon a landlord when injury occurs due
to the lack of repair, Justice Cardozo took as his starting point that a
landlord's "[11iability in tort is an incident to occupation and control."" 2 He then noted that "occupation and control are not reserved
through an agreement that the landlord will repair . .

.

.The land-

lord has at most a privilege to enter for the doing of the work
.... ,83 It followed that a landlord remained immune from tort lia-

bility despite the breach of a covenant to repair. Alluding to a notion
of public policy supporting such a rule, Justice Cardozo wrote that
the "tenant and no one else may keep visitors away till the danger is
abated, or adapt the warning to the need."' 84 The idea was that the
tenant as the land occupier had control over the land and could protect himself from liability by keeping persons away from the dangerous condition or by warning them. This was thought to be untrue of
the landlord-even if he had contracted to repair the premises.
Almost half a century after Justice Cardozo's Cullings decision,
the New York Court of Appeals in 1976 joined the modern trend
and held landlords liable to their tenants where the landlord had
breached his covenant to repair.8 5 In overruling Cullings, the court
in Putnam v. Stout surveyed the "various social policy factors [that]
must be considered. 8 6 The court noted that "tenants may often be
nam v. Stout, 38 N.Y.2d 607, 345 N.E.2d 319, 381 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1976). See supra text
accompanying notes 5-11. See also infra notes 81-89.
79. See, e.g., Del Pino v. Gualtieri, 265 Cal. App. 2d 912, 919-20, 71 Cal. Rtpr.
716, 721 (1968).
80. See, e.g., Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 145, 146 P. 423, 424 (1915),
overruled, Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 616, 517 P.2d at 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
81. 256 N.Y. 287, 176 N.E. 397 (1931), overruled, Putnam v. Stout, 38 N.Y.2d
607, 345 N.E.2d 319, 381 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1976).
82. 256 N.Y. at 290, 176 N.E. at 398.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Putnam, 38 N.Y.2d at 616-17, 345 N.E.2d at 325, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
86. Id. at 617-18, 345 N.E.2d at 326, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 854 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF TORTS § 357 comment b (1965)).

financially unable to make repairs .
Furthermore, because
"their possession is for a limited term . . . the incentive to make
*."..-

repairs is significantly less than that of a landlord."8 8 Finally, because he receives "pecuniary benefit from the relationship, the landlord could properly be expected to assume certain obligations with
respect to the safety of others . ... "89
The most interesting aspect of Putnam is the shift in the policy
perspective of the New York Court of Appeals since its Cullings decision. Just as implied warranty of habitability cases, such as
Javins9" and Green,91 had replaced an "estates in land" analysis with
a modern contract analysis, so Putnam replaced Cullings' traditional
"possession and control" analysis with modern tort analysis. The tort
decisions of the past quarter century have emphasized safety considerations and the increased importance of victim compensation, especially where loss spreading is possible.92 In contrast, for the 1931
Cullings court, possession and control had been the central analytical tool in determining a landlord's tort obligations.9 3 The court was
unconcerned with whether the landlord acted reasonably; the dominant policy was to protect from tort liability landlords who, unlike
tenants, did not have possession and control and thus could not keep
visitors away from dangerous conditions on the premises. 94 In its preoccupation with the conceptual framework of occupation and control, the Cullings court ignored the fact that the landlord could best
protect both himself and potential accident victims by honoring his
covenant to make repairs. The court gave little weight to safety considerations (or victim compensation), focusing instead on protecting
landlords who had failed to honor covenants to repair. In contrast,
Putnam, in rejecting the Cullings approach, focused on safety. As
between landlords and tenants, it is landlords who should be looked
to in order to assure the safety of leased premises-both because of
their greater financial capacity and because of their long-term interest in the property.9 5 Tort liability was seen to follow from these
safety considerations. Moreover, the increased incidence of victim
compensation was seen as not unfair to landlords: because landlords
benefit pecuniarily from the landlord-tenant relationship, they can
87.
88.
89.
90.
400 U.S.
91.
(1974).
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 618, 345 N.E.2d at 326, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
Id.
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
925 (1970).
Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
256 N.Y. at 290, 176 N.E. at 398.
Id.
Putnam, 38 N.Y.2d at 617-18, 345 N.E.2d at 326, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
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properly be6 expected to assume obligations with respect to the safety
9
of others.
The shift in Putnam from a narrow property focus on possession
and control to a tort focus has implications beyond the actual Putnam holding. Thus, for example, the safety considerations the Putnam court relied on to impose liability for breach of a covenant to
repair also suggest the appropriateness of landlord liability for unsafe conditions even absent such a covenant. The landlord has both
the greater financial capacity and, because of his long-term interest
in the property, the greater incentive to make repairs. 97 In shifting
from property to tort analysis, the Putnam court was not unaware of
the implications of the shift. It noted that "[i] ndeed, one jurisdiction
has even gone further and held that notwithstanding the absence of a
covenant to repair or the retention of control over the premises, a
landlord may be held liable for the failure to exercise reasonable
care to keep the premises in good repair." 98
The jurisdiction referred to in Putnam was, of course, New
Hampshire, which in its 1973 Sargent v. Ross99 decision had ruled
that landlords are to be held to a full duty of due care, thereby rejecting the entire traditional framework of landlord immunity rules.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Sargent expressly repudiated the "orthodox analysis" 100 of landlord tort liability, which had
focused on possession and control. In effect, the court found such a
property analysis to be inconsistent with the policy considerations
that should govern tort liability-especially considerations of safety.
"In fact," the court wrote, "the traditional 'control' rule actually discourages a landlord from remedying a dangerous condition since his
repairs may be evidence of his control." 101 More fundamentally, "ordinarily the landlord is best able to remedy dangerous conditions,
particularly where a substantial alteration is required."' 0 2 Abolishing
the traditional immunity rules was thus seen as desirable because
"the ordinary negligence standard should help insure that a landlord
will take whatever precautions are reasonably necessary under the
circumstances to reduce the likelihood of injuries from defects in his
96. Id. at 618, 345 N.E.2d at 326, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
97.

98.
Sargent v.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.

Id. at 616-17 n.6, 345 N.E.2d at 325 n.6, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 853-54 n.6 (citing
Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973)).
113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
Id. at 394, 308 A.2d at 532.
Id.
Id.

property."103
The shift from a property focus on possession and control to a tort
focus emphasizing safety and expanded compensation in cases such
as Putnam and Sargent suggests the necessity of examining the issue
of landlord tort liability from a broader tort perspective. To begin
with, the tort considerations of safety and compensation have been
seen in products liability cases to justify the adoption of strict liability rules.104 These considerations, by analogy, can also be seen to
point beyond negligence liability of landlords to a doctrine of strict
landlord tort liability.1 0 5 Indeed, the Sargent decision itself implicitly
suggested this. The court concluded its discussion of tort policy by
quoting from its prior decision recognizing the implied warranty of
habitability in apartment leases: "It is appropriate that the landlord
who will retain ownership of the premises and any permanent improvements should bear the cost of repairs necessary to make the
premises safe .

. . ."10

In addition, the landlord tort liability cases

can be seen, from a tort perspective, as part of broader doctrinal
trends. Analyzing landlord tort liability in a broader doctrinal context also suggests a movement toward strict liability.
Viewed from a broader tort perspective, Sargent's holding that
landlords owe a full duty of care is hardly surprising. Indeed, when
the California Supreme Court considered its 1985 Becker strict liability decision, landlords in California had already been held to a full
duty of care, despite the fact that the California Supreme Court had
never so held. In California, the abolition of the traditional framework of landlord immunity rules had been accomplished by courts of
appeal. In Brennan v. Cockrell Investments, Inc., °7 for example, the
court of appeal in 1973 held that a landlord is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of the leased premises in order
to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. Brennan
(and, for that matter, Sargent v. Ross) can be seen simply as the
application to landlords of the California Supreme Court's holding in
its landmark 1968 decision in Rowland v. Christian."8 Prior to Rowland all landowners and occupiers shared a broad immunity from
tort liability. The traditional scheme of tort rules classified plaintiffs
as trespassers, licensees, or invitees, and held that a full duty of care
was owed only to invitees. 10 9 Licensees (social guests) and trespass103. Id. at 399, 308 A.2d at 535.
104. See supra notes 31-46 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 128-47 and accompanying text.
106. 113 N.H. at 399, 308 A.2d at 535 (quoting Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92,
276 A.2d 248, 251 (1971)).
107. 35 Cal. App. 3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973). See also Stoiber v.
Honeychuck, 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1980).
108. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
109. Id. at 113-14, 443 P.2d at 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
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ers (even if "innocent" trespassers) were denied compensation even
'where a landowner or occupier was admittedly negligent."10 In Rowland, the California Supreme Court recognized that this traditional
scheme was an historical anomaly, reflecting views contrary to contemporary conceptions of sound policy."" In its Rowland decision,
the California Supreme Court became the first American court to
abolish the traditional common law classifications based on the status of the plaintiff when it held that the proper standard to be applied to the landowner or occupier is the negligence test: "whether in
the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in
view of the probability of injury to others ....
The Brennan court viewed its extension of negligence principles to
landlords as a specific application of the Rowland holding"13 and the
basic policy of California as recognized in Rowland and expressed in
section 1714 of the Civil Code: every person is responsible for injuries caused to others by his failure to use ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property or person." x4 In ruling that landlords are
held to a duty of ordinary care, the Brennan court rejected the proposition that landlords should be immune from negligence liability
simply because they are not in possession of the leased premises. The
court wrote that "it is impossible to perceive any legitimate public
interest that would be promoted by the creation of a landlord immunity . .

.-.

In light of the increased legal obligations of landlords in the warranty of habitability cases and the increased obligations of landowners in Rowland, the Sargent and Brennan holdings should have come
as no surprise. Moreover, a broader perspective on these holdings
reinforces this conclusion and suggests further implications. The
traditional immunity of landlords from tort liability was not merely
a specific tort application of landlord and tenant law principles. The
tort immunity of landlords was instead part and parcel of the general
tort framework developed by nineteenth-century American courts.
The defining characteristic of that tort system was immunity from

110.
111.
112.
have since
176-77.
113.

supra note 3, at 393, 412.
69 Cal. 2d at 113, 117, 443 P.2d at 564-65, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 100-01, 103.
Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. A number of jurisdictions
followed the Rowland holding. M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 11, at
PROSSER & KEETON,

35 Cal. App. 3d at 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.

114.

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714 (West 1985).

115.

35 Cal. App. 3d at 800, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125.

negligence liability.11 Injured plaintiffs were frequently left without
116. Professor Gary Schwartz, after examining the nineteenth-century tort law of
New Hampshire and California, has recently questioned the conventional interpretation
of nineteenth-century tort history. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in NineteenthCentury America: A Reinterpretation,90 YALE L. J. 1717 (1981). In the conventional
view, "no duty" rules limited even the negligence liability of specific activities. Id. at
1717 & 1766. Schwartz argues, however, that "[flar from erecting a duty prerequisite to
every tort claim, the Courts easily recognized that everyone owes a duty to everyone else
to abstain from negligent conduct." Id. at 1773. This finding makes all the more dramatic Schwartz's contention that New Hampshire and California courts "expanded on
the negligence standard in ways that rendered it ambitious and demanding, narrowing
the gap between negligence and strict liability." Id.
Despite Schwartz's exhaustive research, we are not persuaded. First, Schwartz acknowledges that important limitations on negligence liability did, in fact, exist. He notes
that the landowner cases, with their special no duty rule applicable to trespassers, and
the "outright immunity" that was "flaunted" in the area of governmental tort liability,
id. at 1770, represent exceptions to his generalization that "everyone owes a duty to
everyone else to abstain from negligent conduct." Id. at 1773. More significantly, he also
notes "the serious tort law obstacles that an injured worker faced, especially the wellknown trinity of employer defenses: contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and
the fellow-servant rule." Id. at 1769. In this regard, he cites "the number and proportion
of. . . claims . . . denied [and] the uniqueness and perhaps wrongness of the reasons
relied on in those denials .... " Id. at 1770-71. In assessing the significance of the
employee accident cases, one should note the enormous importance, relative to other
nineteenth-century tort issues, of employer tort liability (prior to workers' compensation
plans)-in terms of the number of persons injured, dollar amounts involved, number of
cases litigated, and volume of tort doctrine generated.
With respect to other "no duty" rules, Schwartz writes:
[N]ineteenth-century law in New Hampshire and California was remarkably
free of the special no-duty and immunity rules that later cluttered and complicated those states' laws. In the nineteenth century, neither state's law suggested, for example, that charities were immune from claims brought by patients; that vehicle drivers were immune vis-a-vis their social guests; or that
family members were immune from suits by other family members. And the
only suit brought against a product seller for an injury caused by a product
defect led to a victory for the nonprivity product victim.
Id. at 1766 (footnotes deleted). From this passage one might infer that the "ambitious
and demanding," id. at 1773, negligence standard resulted in compensation of accident
victims in these sorts of cases. Our interpretation of Schwartz's research leads us to
doubt this conclusion. With respect to victims of charities, vehicle drivers (as to nonpaying passengers), and family members, Schwartz writes in a footnote that "[ilt is not the
case that the Courts were actually imposing liability in those situations; there simply
were no suits." Id. at 1766 n.364. Since it is totally implausible that no such injuries
were negligently caused during the nineteenth century, one must wonder why there were
no suits. The reasonable conclusion would seem to be that suits were not brought because
attorneys knew, in part by reference to decisions in other jurisdictions, that courts would
throw them out. Similarly, although it may be true that "the only suit against a product
seller for an injury caused by a product defect led to victory for the nonprivity product
victim," id. at 1766, it would be incorrect to infer that nineteenth-century California case
law anticipated Justice Cardozo's landmark 1916 decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), which overturned the well-established
privity barrier to negligence liability established by Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng.
Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). See, e.g., Loop v. Lichfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870). Schwartz's footnote citation to the California case reveals that it is not a MacPherson-type case at all.
Schwartz, supra, at 1776 n.365. The case, Lewis v. Terry, 111 Cal. 39, 43 P. 398 (1896),
allowed a tenant to recover against a retailer who had willfully misrepresented the safety
of a folding bed to the buyer landlord. Thus it seems likely that California and New
Hampshire attorneys knew in nonprivity negligence products cases what they knew in
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compensation by traditional tort law that was extolled by its advocates as a "negligence system," 117 when in fact it was a harsh system
of immunity rules that denied compensation even when defendant
negligence was present.1 18 The landlord immunity rules, along with
the privity rule in products cases, governmental and other immunities, the contributory negligence rule, the fellow servant rule, the
doctrine of assumption of risk and other judicially-created devices,
often left plaintiffs without compensation even when defendant negligence was clear.11 9 Brennan and Sargent thus resemble previous judicial abrogations of traditional immunity rules, such as MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 1 20 and more recently the leading decisions
of the California Supreme Court. 2 1
This broadened perspective reinforces the conclusion that the
Brennan holding, in which landlords are held to a duty of due care,
is unlikely to be the culmination of judicial reform of the law of
landlord tort liability. Instead, Brennan is an intermediate step toward a doctrine of strict landlord tort liability. In terms of the evolution of the common law of torts, Brennan is analogous to Justice
122
Cardozo's classic decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
which recognized the undesirability of privity limitations upon plaintiff recovery in products cases. 123 The result of MacPherson and its
progeny was the imposition of a general duty of care on manufacturers, without regard to privity of contract. The pre-MacPhersonprivity requirement was similar to the pre-Brennan landlord liability
rules; each served to insulate a defendant from liability even where
the defendant had failed to exercise reasonable care. Brennan's reccharity, family and vehicle cases: bringing a tort suit would be futile because an immunity rule prevailed. Indeed, the Terry court cited approvingly the Winterbottom rule and
American cases following it. Id. at 44, 43 P.2d at 399. See generally infra note 118.
117.

O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 69-103 (Howe ed. 1963); Seavey, Mr.

Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 374-75 (1939).
118.

See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927)

(Holmes, J.); Glynn v. Central R.R. of New Jersey, 175 Mass. 570, 56 N.E. 698 (1900)
(Holmes, J.); Lamson v. American Ax & Tool Co., 177 Mass. 144, 58 N.E. 585 (1900)
(Holmes, J.); McCarvel v. Sawyer, 173 Mass. 540, 54 N.E. 259 (1899) (Holmes, J.).

119. See generally supra notes 116-18.
120.
121.

217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.

Rptr. 858 (1975) (contributory negligence no longer bars plaintiff's recovery); Rowland,
69 Cal. 2d at 108, 443 P.2d at 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 97 (landowner must act as a
reasonable person; traditional landowner immunity rules abrogated); Muskopf v. Corning
Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (governmental immunity abolished).
122. 217 N.Y. at 382, 111 N.E. at 1050.
123. See id. at 389-91, 111 N.E. at 1053.

ognition of a general duty of reasonable care for landlords is analogous to MacPherson's recognition of a general duty of reasonable
care for manufacturers. However, as Justice Traynor recognized as
early as 1944,124 MacPherson was merely an intermediate step toward a doctrine of strict liability for defective products. Brennan is
also merely an intermediate step. By clearing, away the traditional
rules of landlord immunity in favor of a duty of due care, Brennan
paved the way for consideration of the next step: strict tort liability
of landlords. Thus, the issue became whether the law and policies
articulated in the strict products liability cases support such a
doctrine.
STRICT TORT LIABILITY OF LANDLORDS

As discussed in the previous section, modern landlord tort liability
decisions, including Sargent's125 1973 imposition of a duty of due
care, could be seen as implicitly posing the question of strict liability
of landlords-both because of their embrace of contemporary tort
policies and because of their doctrinal similarity to the pre-strict liability products cases. The issue of strict landlord tort liability was, in
fact, explicitly raised in California one year prior to Sargent. In
1972 a California court of appeal faced the question whether a landlord was strictly liable to a tenant injured by a defective sofa. In
Fakhoury v. Magner,26 the court concluded that strict liability was
127
compelled by the law and policies of strict products liability.
Whether that conclusion is correct is the subject of this section of
the Article.
The Analytical and Policy Framework
In examining the strict liability case law, it is perhaps surprising
to discover how analytically easy the step is to landlord strict liability. Strict liability of manufacturers of defective products is, of
course, now firmly established in American law. 28 It is also hornbook law that this strict liability doctrine extends to retailers of defective products. 29 Because of the marked similarity of product lessors and renters to product retailers, New Jersey 130 and
124. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 465, 150 P.2d 436, 442
(1944) (Traynor, J.,concurring).
125. Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
126. 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972).
127. Id. at 62-64, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 475-77.
128. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 694.
129. Id. at 706-07. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391
P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).
130. Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing and Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965).
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California,' the leading product liability jurisdictions, quickly and
easily extended strict liability to such entities. The California Supreme Court's decision in Price v. Shell Oil Co. 13 2 emphasized the
court's desire to "make [it] clear that the [strict liability] doctrine
should be made applicable to lessors in the same way as we have
made it applicable to sellers."' 33 The court also emphasized that it
could not
see how the risk of harm associated with the use of the chattel can vary
with the legal form under which it is held. . . .[Lessors, like manufacturers and retailers,] are able to bear the cost of compensating for injuries
resulting4 from defects by spreading the loss through an adjustment of the
rental."

The application of strict liability to lessors of products represents
hornbook law, with Prosser and Keeton reporting that "[t]his would
be the generally accepted view today because there is no visible reason for any distinction between those engaged in the
business of
35
renting and those engaged in the business of selling."'
New Jersey 1 36 and California13 7 have also applied strict liability to

the production and sale of housing, especially by mass developers. In
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,"3 8 the New Jersey Supreme Court
applied strict liability to the builder-vendor of mass-produced homes,
writing that
[t]he public interest dictates that if. . . injury does result from the defective construction, its cost should be borne by the responsible developer who
created the danger and who is in the better economic position to bear the
loss rather than by the injured party who justifiably relied on the developer's skill and implied representation."39

In Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.,140 a California court of appeal
reached the same result in a decision subsequently approved of by
131. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 253, 466 P.2d at 727, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
134. Id. at 251-52, 466 P.2d at 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
135. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 719.
136. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
137. See, e.g., Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 749 (1969).
138. 44 N.J. at 70, 207 A.2d at 314.
139. Id. at 91, 207 A.2d at 326.
140. 269 Cal. App. 2d at 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 749. Subsequent court of appeal
decisions concurred. E.g., Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1969) (applying Kriegler to defect in land upon which home built); Hyman v.
Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973) (strict liability of home builder
who was not mass developer).

the California Supreme Court. 141 The Kriegler court concluded that
"in terms of today's society, there are no meaningful distinctions between Eichler's mass production and sale of homes and the mass
production and sale of automobiles . .

.

. [T]he pertinent overriding

policy considerations are the same. "142
These two lines of authority-the leased product cases and the application of strict liability to housing-point clearly to the application of strict liability to landlords. Because strict liability has been
applied to sellers of housing and because courts have made it clear
that lessors in the business of leasing are not insulated from strict
liability rules that would apply to sellers in the same context, the
analytical basis for the recognition of landlord strict tort liability is
clear.
The policies articulated in the strict products liability cases also
have ready application to the issue of landlord strict liability. Strict
products liability has been seen to be justified by consumer expectations of safety and by safety incentive and loss spreading considerations.'43 Courts have often recognized that persons entering leased
premises have reasonable expectations of safety analogous to persons
who encounter manufactured products.144 Similarly, the safety incentives of strict liability are properly directed at landlords. A landlord in the business of leasing has experience with the building and is
in a position to discover and cure dangerously defective conditions in
the premises. 4" Landlords, and their staffs, also make choices which
affect the safety of the leased premises. These choices may involve.
the initial design and equipping of the premises, upkeep and maintenance, or repair and replacement. These choices necessarily involve
tradeoffs between cost and safety. Application of a rule of strict tort
liability would create a safety incentive for landlords in the construction, equipping, and maintenance of the leased premises, thus promoting safety in a manner analogous to strict liability of manufacturers and retailers. 46 Finally, a rule of landlord strict liability
would assure that losses due to dangerous defects in leased premises
are not an overwhelming misfortune to the injured individual, but
147
instead are spread by the landlord as a cost of doing business.
141. Price, 2 Cal. 3d at 251, 466 P.2d at 726, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 182. See also
Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 378, 525 P.2d 88, 90, 115
Cal. Rptr. 648, 650 (1974).
142. 269 Cal. App. 2d at 227, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
143. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1974).
145. Id. at 624, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
146. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
147. Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 64, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473, 477 (1972).
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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Landlords, like manufacturers, retailers, and lessors of products, can
insure and spread liability costs among the public as a cost of doing
business. Thus, the loss spreading rationale has clear application in
the context of leased premises.
Landlord Strict Liability Prior to Becker v. IRM Corp.
Since Fakhoury v. Magner,'48 the 1972 court of appeal decision,
strict landlord tort liability has been present in California law. The
Fakhoury case itself demonstrates on a concrete level the difficulty
of not applying strict liability to landlords, given the state of products liability law. Fakhoury involved a lessee of a furnished apartment who was injured when a couch partially collapsed under her.
The Fakhoury court, in applying strict liability to the landlord, purported not to adopt a rule of strict landlord tort liability as such.
Instead, it characterized the landlord as both a lessor of real property and a lessor of furniture, and it held the landlord strictly liable
not as a lessor of property, but as a lessor of furniture.1 49 Itnoted
that "rental of furniture is an enterprise of its own, falling into a
separate category in such places as the yellow pages of the telephone
directory." 150 Noting that "under existing case law.

. .

the lessor of

furniture who supplies it to an empty apartment should be held to
strict liability," 151 the court found no basis for exempting a landlord
from strict liability "just because he is also the owner and lessor of
152
real property."'
If strict liability applies to lessors of products, the Fakhoury court
seems on unassailable ground in refusing to grant a special exemption to lessors of furniture who, at the same time, are landlords. Indeed, one commentator has concluded "the generally accepted notion" is that strict liability applies to the landlord's personal property
found in the furnished premises. 153 Yet, if this is so, then is it possible to preclude further applications of landlord strict liability? This
issue faced a California court of appeal in the 1976 case of Golden v.
Conway."" Golden involved a fire in the leased premises caused by a
defective wall heater that had been installed by a contractor em148. 25 Cal. App. 3d at 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 473. For developments outside California, see infra note 296.
149. Id. at 63, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Browder, supra note 3, at 122.
154. 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).

ployed by the landlord a year or two before the fire. In considering
the issue of landlord strict liability, the court recognized that
Fakhoury had "purported to distinguish between defective fixtures
and defective furniture,"' 55 but concluded that there is "no reason to
distinguish between appliances which are attached to the realty, and
appliances or furniture which are not."'156 Thus, the court extended
the rule of landlord
strict tort liability from defective furniture to
57
fixtures.1
defective
Golden's application of strict tort liability to a defective fixture
(which happened to be a product) raises the question whether landlord strict liability should extend beyond products leased with the
premises. One could argue that the analogy to lessors of products
becomes too attenuated as one attempts to impose strict liability on
landlords beyond cases where the landlord clearly leases a product to
the tenant. From this view, the wall heater case might be seen as a
"hard" case. Beyond the purview of strict liability would be a defective central heating system that explodes or a defective stairway that
collapses. The central heating system is not a product leased to the
tenant and the stairway is not a product at all.
Landlord strict liability cannot be limited to products leased to the
tenant. It is true that Fakhoury's application of strict liability to
leased furniture appeared to be the "easy" case because of the clear
analogy to leased products. One should recall, however, that landlord
strict liability is also an outgrowth of the law defining landlords' obligations.' 58 Suppose the defective stairway was a central stairway
and thus in a common area under the landlord's control. The common law traditionally has imposed a greater obligation with respect
to defective conditions of common areas than to defects within the
leased premises. 59 Thus, if there is strict liability for leased furniture, it would be anomalous not to impose strict liability in the stairway case. The case for strict liability in the central heating example
is at least as compelling. As the California Supreme Court emphasized in recognizing an implied warranty of habitability in Green v.
Superior Court,6 0
complex heating, electrical and plumbing systems are hidden from view,
and the landlord, who has had experience with the building, is certainly in a
much better position to discover and to cure dilapidations in the premises.
Moreover, in a multiple-unit dwelling repair will frequently require access
to equipment and areas solely in the control of the landlord."' 1
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 961, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
Id. at 961, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
Id. at 961-62, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-124.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
Id. at 624, 517 P.2d at 1173, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
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Thus, while the doctrine of landlord strict liability began in
Fakhoury with the application of strict liability to furniture, this beginning was due to the happenstance of the easy analogy to products
liability-specifically, to the retail sale and commercial leasing of
furniture where strict liability clearly would apply. From a policy
perspective, the progression of landlord strict liability, from furniture
to fixtures to defects in the leased structure itself, is anything but
anomalous. Indeed, strict liability can be viewed as especially appropriate with respect to structural aspects of leased premises. In 1983,
a third California court of appeal decision considered the issue of
landlord strict tort liability. Becker v. IRM Corp."'2 involved a tenant injured when he fell through a shower door consisting of untempered glass. The court held that strict liability applied, and it
suggested a general doctrine of landlord strict tort liability, one not
limited to products or fixtures. In the court's view, "it is a reasonable
rule that a landlord should be treated as a 'retailer' of rental housing, subject to liability for defects in the premises rented. 163
A decade or so ago, when suggestions that strict liability be extended to landlords first appeared, 6 such proposals might have been
seen as mere speculation.1 6 5 The California court of appeal decisions
applying strict liability to landlords, however, amount to more than
speculation and suggest a trend. Moreover, in the early 1980's, even
cautious observers could conclude the "generally accepted notion" is
that strict liability applies to the landlord's personal property found
in the furnished premises. 166 As we have seen, it is implausible that
courts would restrict landlord strict liability to products. Indeed,
while the third California court of appeal decision, Becker v. IRM
Corp.,16 7 was being reviewed by the California Supreme Court, the
long-awaited new edition of the Prosser hornbook was published in
1984 under the guidance of Dean Page Keeton. In the new edition 68
the authors wrote that "[tihere seems to be growing support for the
position that the nature of a realty lease, especially a lease of resi162. 192 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1983), vacated, 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 213 (1985). See supra note 20.
163. 192 Cal. Rptr. at 577. See supra note 20.
164. See Love, supra note 3, at 130-57; Ursin, supra note 33, at 837-38 n.82. See
also Note, Products Liability at the Threshold of the Landlord-Lessor, 21 HASTINGS
L.J. 458 (1970).
165. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 27, at 976.
166. Browder, supra note 3, at 122. See infra note 296.
167. 192 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1983), vacated, 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 213 (1985). See supra note 20.
168. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3.

dential premises and, even more specifically, a lease of an apartment,
is not sufficiently different from that of a personal property bailment
to justify different rules or liability."' 9 They concluded that "strict
liability in tort [is] likely to become applicable as against that kind
of lessor or landlord who can be regarded as being engaged in the
business of renting apartments
and other structures as part of his
17 0
business as a realtor.'
Becker v. IRM Corp.
The Decision of the California Supreme Court
In 1985, the California Supreme Court, which had pioneered in
the adoption and elaboration of strict products liability,' 7 ' rendered
its decision in Becker v. IRM Corp.1 2 The court, in an opinion by
Justice Broussard, concluded that strict landlord tort liability was
required by the "rationale of the.

. .

cases

. . .

establishing the du-

ties of a landlord and the doctrine of strict liability in tort . .. .,173
Two justices dissented. Chief Justice Bird concurred in an opinion
that adopted the Becker court of appeal opinion as her own.Y4
The Becker court recognized, as had the court of appeal decisions
of the past decade, 75 that existing strict liability precedents and the
case law defining the obligations of landlords pointed to strict tort
liability of landlords. 176 The court began by noting that the doctrine
of strict tort liability for defective products had evolved from an earlier case law that had "been based on the theory of an express or
77
implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff."'
Quoting the seminal Greenman decision, the court wrote that "the
purpose of strict liability in tort is 'to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves.' "178 The court then noted

that California decisions had followed "a stream of commerce approach to strict liability in tort and [had extended] liability to all
those who are part of the 'overall producing and marketing enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries from defective prod169. Id. at 722.
170. Id.
171. See Ursin, supra note 2. See also supra notes 26-46 and accompanying text.
172. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 1168, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
173. Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
174. Id. at 470, 698 P.2d at 126, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 223. See supra note 20.
175. See supra notes 148-63 and accompanying text.
176. 38 Cal. 3d at 461-64, 698 P.2d at 120-22, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 217-19.
177. Id. at 458, 698 P.2d at 118, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215 (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 459, 698 P.2d at 118, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 215 (quoting Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701
(1963)).

150
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ucts.' "17 Thus strict products liability had been applied not only to
manufacturers but also to retailers, wholesalers, lessors and bailors,
and licensors of personalty. 18 0
The court then noted that a similar evolution had been occurring

in real estate. First, the "[a]pplication of warranty doctrine has not
been limited to those engaged in commerce in personalty but has
been applied where appropriate to those engaged in the real estate

business." 18 1 Indeed, the California Supreme Court had previously
held that an implied warranty of quality attaches to the sale of new

construction.18 2 Just as in the products area, however, implied warranty decisions in the real estate area were precursors to the applica-

tion of strict tort liability. 83 California decisions prior to Becker had
held that strict liability in tort is not limited to "those engaged in
commerce in personalty but has been applied where appropriate to
those engaged in real estate business who impliedly represent the

quality of their product."' 1 4 Thus, for example, in Kriegler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc.18 5 the builder of mass-produced homes was held strictly
liable when the heating system placed in a home failed. Paraphrasing a similar New Jersey decision,"8" the Becker court wrote that the
"public interest dictates that the cost of injury from defects should
be borne by the developer who created the danger and who is in a
better economic position to bear the loss rather than the injured

party who relied
87
representation."'

on

the

developer's

skill

and

implied

179. Id. at 459, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (quoting Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899
(1964)).
180. Id. The court cited the following cases: Vandermark, 61 Cal. 2d at 262, 391
P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899 (retailers); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 25153, 466 P.2d 722, 726-27, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 182-83 (1970) (lessors and bailors); Barth
v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 250-51, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 319-20
(1968) (wholesalers); Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 324-26, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420,
423-24 (1970) (licensors of personalty).
181. 38 Cal. 3d at 459-60, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
182. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 378, 525 P.2d 88,
90, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 650 (1974).
183. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749
(1969).
184. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 460, 698 P.2d at 119, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
185. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969). See supra text accompanying notes 140-42.
186. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 460, 698 P.2d at 119-20, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17. The
court paraphrased Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 91, 207 A.2d 314, 325-26
(1965).
187. 38 Cal. 3d at 460-61, 698 P.2d at 120, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 217.

The evolution of the law governing landlords' obligations, culminating in Becker, followed the same path as that governing products
and the sale of real estate. 188 In Green v. Superior Court, 89 the California Supreme Court had held that a lease for a dwelling contained
an implied warranty of habitability. The court in Becker noted that
the Green decision had drawn the analogy between the warranty of
merchantability and fitness in products cases and the implied warranty of habitability in residential leases, "[p]ointing out that the
modern urban tenant is in the same position as any normal consumer
of goods .
*..."190 Green, however,
had not taken the next
step--consideration of "whether or to what extent breach of the im-

plied warranty of habitability might provide a basis for recovery of

tort damages for injuries caused by the breach."1 91 Even prior to

Green (and Greenman), however, a line of authority had permitted
recovery from landlords of personal injury damages on an implied
warranty theory. 19 2 These cases involved short-term leases of furnished dwellings where the accident occurred shortly after the tenant
went into possession and where the defect existed at the beginning of
the term. 9 3 Subsequent to Greenman, the Becker court noted, strict

tort liability had been applied to landlords
in the previously dis94
cussed Fakhoury and Golden cases.1

After surveying this impressive array of case law pointing to landlord strict tort liability, the California Supreme Court in Becker concluded that
the rationale of the foregoing cases, establishing the duties of a landlord
and the doctrine of strict liability in tort, requires us to conclude that a
landlord engaged in the business of leasing dwellings is strictly liable in tort
for injuries resulting from a latent defect in the premises when the defect
existed at the time the premises were let to the tenant.195

The court wrote that it is "clear that landlords are part of the 'overall producing and marketing enterprise' that makes housing ac188. Id. at 461, 698 P.2d at 120, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
189. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
190. 38 Cal. 3d at 462, 698 P.2d at 121, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 218. See supra text
accompanying notes 57-76 for a discussion of Green.
191. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 462, 698 P.2d at 121, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
192. See, e.g., Fisher v. Pennington, 116 Cal. App. 248, 249-51, 2 P.2d 518, 51920 (1931); Charleville v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 136 Cal. App. 349, 355, 29 P.2d 241,
244-45 (1934); Hunter v. Freeman, 105 Cal. App. 2d 129, 131, 233 P.2d 65, 67 (1951);
Forrester v. Hoover Hotel & Inv. Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 226, 232, 196 P.2d 825, 828
(1948). See also Stowe v. Fritzie Hotels, Inc., 44 Cal. 2d 416, 424, 282 P.2d 890, 894
(1955). The Becker court interpreted Stowe as not disapproving of this line of authority.
38 Cal. 3d at 463 n.3, 698 P.2d at 122 n.3, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219 n.3. But see Love,
supra note 3, at 56 n.189.
193. See supra cases cited at note 192.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 148-57.
195. 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
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comodations available to renters." 196 Moreover, "a landlord, like defendant owning numerous units, is not engaged in isolated acts
within the enterprise but plays a substantial role.' 191 7 The court emphasized that the "fact that the enterprise is one involving real estate
may not immunize the landlord."19
In support of its holding the court in Becker reiterated the policy
themes that had been central to its products liability holdings, finding them also applicable to landlords. Thus, it reemphasized its view
that the "paramount policy of the strict products liability rule remains the spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating
otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects."199 The
court saw strict landlord tort liability to be supported by the considerations that have been central to the development of strict products
liability: the recognition of legitimate expectations of safety, promotion of safety, and compensation of accident victims and spreading of
accident costs throughout society. 200 "Absent disclosure of defects,"
the court wrote, "the landlord in renting the premises makes an implied representation that the premises are fit for use as a dwelling
....
"201 Safety considerations also point to a strict liability rule:
"The tenant purchasing housing for a limited period is in no position
to inspect for latent defects in the increasingly complex modern
apartment buildings or to bear the expense of repair whereas the
landlord is in a much better position to inspect for and repair latent
defects. 20 2 From this realistic perspective, it is clear that the "tenant renting the dwelling is compelled to rely upon the implied assurance of safety made by the landlord. ' 20 3 Finally, compensation of
the accident victim is desirable because "the landlord by adjustment
of price at the time he acquires the property, by rentals or by insurance is in a better position to bear the costs of injuries due to defects
in the premises than the tenants." 204 Summarizing these perceptions
the court, paraphrasing the Greenman formulation, 20 5 wrote that
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. (citation omitted).
199. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (citation omitted).
200. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
201. 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
202. Id. (citation omitted).
203. Id. at 465, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
204. Id.
205. In Greenman, Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, stated that "the purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective
products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather

"strict liability

. . .

must be applied to insure that the landlord who

markets the product bears the cost of injuries resulting from the defects 'rather than the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves.' "206

The Becker Dissent
Two of the seven members of the California Supreme Court dissented from the Becker strict liability holding. 207 Given the California precedents, the Becker dissenters faced no easy task. As previously discussed, the California Supreme Court had endorsed the
application of strict tort liability to sellers of housing; 208 and in its
Price decision holding lessors of products to strict liability, it had
emphasized, "we make [it] clear that [the strict liability] doctrine
should be made applicable to lessors in the same way we have made
it applicable to sellers." 20 9 The analytical basis was thus clear for the
recognition of a rule of strict landlord tort liability.210 Moreover,
court of appeal decisions beginning in 1972, including the vacated
court of appeal decision in Becker,2"' had already taken this step.
The question for the dissent was whether it could avoid the obvious implications of these cases, or whether it would argue that one or
more of these decisions should be repudiated. The dissent, for example, could have argued that the extension of strict liability to lessors
of products had been a mistake. Or it could have argued that the
lessor cases should not have been extended to landlords who also
lease products with the premises. Or it could have argued that once
one moves beyond landlords who lease products with the premises,
strict liability is inappropriate because we are now in the realm of
"landlord" as opposed to "products" liability. As we have previously
discussed,212 each of these positions would have been difficult to
maintain in light of the case law and policies of strict tort liability.
But each of these positions would have attempted to draw a line that
would separate products liability from landlord (and, perhaps, lesthan by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701
(1963).
206. 38 Cal. 3d at 465, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
207. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213
(1985) (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk concurred with Justice
Lucas.
208. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 251, 466 P.2d 722, 726, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178, 182 (1970). See also Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374,
378, 525 P.2d 88, 90, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 650 (1974).
209. 2 Cal. 3d at 253, 466 P.2d at 727, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 128-47.
211. Becker v. IRM Corp., 192 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1983), vacated, 38 Cal. 3d 454,
698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985). See supra note 20.
212. See supra notes 26-50 & 148-70 and accompanying text.
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sor) liability.
The dissent took none of these positions. Instead, it adopted a position that would impose a broad strict tort liability on some landlords
but not on others. The dissent chose to adopt and elaborate upon the
position proposed by defendant IRM Corporation21 3 that would impose strict liability on a landlord who is the original owner of a
building, but not on a landlord, such as IRM Corporation, who
purchases an existing building which is not new--"an already 'produced' [apartment complex] ."214 For the dissent, strict liability is appropriate for a landlord who furnishes a product that he has purchased from a manufacturer or retailer but not for "landlords of
used property [who] have no special position with regard to original
manufacturers and sellers .... -2'1 The crucial distinction is "between a party actually selecting, installing, constructing and buying
the defective product and a party who plays no such role and therefore has no connection with anyone up the ladder of distribution
"216

For the dissenters, the appeal of that position apparently was that
it avoided the necessity of urging the overruling of previous applications of strict liability, including the court of appeal landlord decisions, 217 while allowing them to reject strict liability in Becker. On
analysis, however, the dissent's position appears untenable. The case
law and policies of strict liability do not support the distinction proposed by the dissent. Analysis of the dissent, in fact, demonstrates
the strength of the strict liability precedents relied upon by the majority to support its holding.
The dissent purports to derive its position from existing strict liability case law, including Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. 18 and

213. See Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 465, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
214. Id. at 481, 698 P.2d at 134, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
215. Id. at 487, 698 P.2d at 138-39, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36.
216. Id. at 481, 698 P.2d at 134, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 231 (emphasis deleted).
217. Thus, strict liability was appropriate in Fakhoury because the landlord had
purchased and installed the defective couch, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 61-62, 101 Cal. Rptr. at
475, and in Golden, because the landlord had equipped the apartment with the defective
wall heater. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 951-53, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72. In contrast, "IRM Corporation had purchased an already-produced [apartment complex] . . . . [T]he shower
doors had not been purchased by defendant." Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 481, 698 P.2d at 134,
213 Cal. Rptr. at 231. Thus, unlike the landlords in Fakhoury and Golden, IRM Corporation had no connection with a retailer or manufacturer, entities "up the ladder of distribution" of the shower doors. Id. See supra notes 148-61 and accompanying text for a
discussion of these cases.
218.

61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964).

Price v. Shell Oil Co.-19 In Vandermark the California Supreme
Court had referred to the fact that retailers and manufacturers are

in a "continuing business relationship"220 and thus can "adjust the
costs . . . between them in the course of their continuing business

relationship. '221 The dissent also points to language in Price, which
had extended strict liability to lessors. Price had spoken of "the necessity for a continuing course of business as a condition for the application of [strict liability].11222 As an initial matter, this Price language does not support the dissent's position. The court in Price was
concerned that the lessor be engaged in a "continuing course of business," namely "the business of leasing. ' 223 The court was not focusing on whether the lessor had a continuing business relationship with
a manufacturer of the vehicles it leased. Similarly, strict liability
would seem applicable to a commercial lessor of vehicles regardless

of how and from whom it acquired the vehicles and whether it acquired them new or used.
A flaw in the dissent's attempt to distinguish landlords who originally own and equip the leased premises from landlords who acquire
used rental property can also be seen by examining the dissent's
treatment of the successor corporation cases. In the leading case of

Ray v. Alad Corp., 24 the California Supreme Court held, in part

219. 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
220. Becker, 38 Cal, 3d at 480, 698 P.2d at 134, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 231 (quoting
Vandermark, 61 Cal. 3d at 262-63, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900).
221. Id. (emphasis deleted). The defendant in Becker had argued that strict liability was inappropriate because it had "never been in a business relationship with the
builder and [because] purchasers of used rental properties do not have a continuing business relationship with builders permitting adjustments of the costs of protecting tenants."
38 Cal. 3d at 465, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220. The court found this argument unpersuasive. It emphasized that a continuing business relationship is not essential
to the imposition of strict liability. The court noted that, even absent a continuing business relationship with manufacturers or others, landlords might often be able to recoup
any losses by seeking equitable indemnity. Id. at 467, 698 P.2d at 124, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
221. More importantly, the "unavailability of the manufacturer is not a factor militating
against liability of others engaged in the enterprise." Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213
Cal. Rptr. at 220. This conclusion was compelled because the "paramount policy of the
strict products liablity rule remains the spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects." Id. Thus, contrary to
the defendant's argument, "[i]f anything, the unavailability of the manufacturer is a
factor militating in favor of liability of persons engaged in the enterprise who can spread
the cost of compensation." Id. The court concluded that, "[j]ust as the unavailability of
the manufacturer does not militate against liability," so "the absence of a continuing
business relationship between builder and landlord is not a factor warranting denial of
strict liability of the landlord." Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123-24, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220-21.
When injury is caused by latent defects existing at the time of the lease, landlords
"should bear the cost . . . rather than the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves." Id. at 467, 698 P.2d at 124, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
222. Price, 2 Cal. 3d at 253, 466 P.2d at 727, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 183 (citing Vandermark, 61 Cal. 2d at 262-63, 391 P.2d at 172, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 900).
223. Id.
224. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
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based on the loss spreading policy, 225 that a corporation that acquired all the assets of the manufacturer of a defective product and
continued to run the business in a manner almost identical to its
original form could be held strictly liable for defects in a product
manufactured by the predecessor corporation.226 In the dissent's
view, the crucial factor in Alad was the "almost complete overlap of
the corporate entities," 227 and this was said to be untrue of the "relationship between the landlord. . . and any party participating in the
original manufacture and distribution of the shower door." 228s On the
dissent's own terms, this reasoning seems flawed. If, as the dissent
assumes, strict liability is appropriate with respect to a landlord who
originally owns and equips leased premises,229 then Alad indicates it
is also appropriate for a successor landlord who, to paraphrase Alad,
acquires all the assets of the original landlord and continues to run
the business in a manner almost identical to its original form.230
More fundamentally, the policy considerations that have dominatedthe evolution of strict liability (and that the Becker court, as
well as the previous court of appeal decisions, saw supporting landlord strict liability) do not support the dissent's position. Certainly,
the need for compensation and the capacity of landlords to spread
accident costs do not vary depending on whether a tenant is injured
in an apartment building owned by the original owner rather than a
landlord who purchased the building from another. Thus the loss
spreading policy, long central to strict liability,231 does not support
the dissent's distinction between landlords of new and used property;23 2 indeed, the dissent concedes this.2 33
Similarly, the safety incentives of strict liability would seem properly directed to landlords of new or used property. It is true that an
original owner may play a role in the design of a building whereas
the landlord who purchases a used building will not have played such
a role. Nevertheless, the "used property" landlord plays an integral
role in assuring the safety of the leased premises by inspection, repair and replacement policies. Cases such as the California Supreme
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 30-31, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80.
Id. at 33-34, 560 P.2d at 10-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 484, 698 P.2d at 137, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 234.

228.

Id.

229.
230.

Id. at 487, 698 P.2d at 138, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
Alad, 19 Cal. 3d at 33-34, 560 P.2d at 10-11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.

231.

See supra note 31.

232.
233.

Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
Id. at 482, 698 P.2d at 135, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 232.

Court's Vandermark decision that have imposed strict liability on

retailers have noted that "the retailer himself may play a substantial
part in insuring that the product is safe . . . ."2 It should be obvious that landlords of used property may play a substantial part in

insuring that the leased premises are safe. 235 Landlords do-and
have a duty to 2 3 ---inspect, maintain and repair the leased premises.

The California Supreme Court had previously emphasized the public
policy that "landlords . . . bear the primary responsibility for maintaining safe, clean, and habitable housing . . ,.".
Indeed, the

landlord is, on this ground, an easier case for strict liability than
many retailers. With respect to many products-such as products
sold in sealed containers-retailers can do little or nothing to increase product safety.238 In contrast, landlords of new or used rental
properties play an integral role in assuring the continued safety of
leased premises.
Finally, it would seem that tenant expectations of safety are also

independent of the distinction the dissent seeks to draw between
landlords of new and used property. A tenant will have the same
expectations of safety with respect to furniture, heaters, and shower
doors when he leases from the landlord who originally owned the
building as when he leases from a successor landlord. Indeed, the
tenant is unlikely to know which situation he or she is in. Thus if
safety expectations justify strict liability as to the former, they would
also justify strict liability as to the latter. The retailer cases, with
their well-settled strict liability rule239 (which the dissent accepts),24°
234. 61 Cal. 2d at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
235. The Becker dissent ignored this aspect of Vandermark's safety incentive argument. It focused solely on another aspect of Vandermark's safety incentive argument-that retailers may exert pressure for safety on manufacturers. Vandermark, 61
Cal. 2d at 262, 391 P.2d at 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 899. The Becker dissent argued that
landlords of used property, unlike retailers, "have no special position with regard to original manufacturers and sellers and thus have no influence to wield in order to improve
product safety." 38 Cal. 3d at 482, 698 P.2d at 135, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 232. This, of
course, assumes that original landlords have such influence, which is not at all clear.
Moreover, as both the court and dissent recognize, landlords may in appropriate cases be
able to recoup any losses by actions against manufacturers or others responsible for defective conditions on the premises. Id. at 466, 698 P.2d at 123, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220
(Broussard, J.); id. at 489 n.6, 698 P.2d at 139 n.6, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 236 n.6 (Lucas, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Thus, strict liability of landlords of new or used property
arguably creates pressure for safety by exposing manufacturers and others to potential
liability to landlords seeking to recover for liability imposed upon them.
236. Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 629, 517 P.2d 1168, 1176, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 712 (1974).
237. Id. at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
238. Indeed, Justice Traynor in his Escola concurring opinion wrote that
"[c]ertainly there is greater reason to impose liability on the manufacturer than on the
retailer who is but a conduit of a product that he himself is not able to test." 24 Cal. 2d
at 468, 150 P.2d at 444 (Traynor, J., concurring). See R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAw 62 (1980).
239. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 692.
240. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 481, 698 P.2d at 134, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
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again suggest that strict liability is appropriate for landlords of new
or used property. When one purchases a product from a retailer, expectations of safety exist. These expectations, however, derive from
the perception that manufacturers create safe products. Often consumers have no expectation that retailers will take independent steps
to assure product safety.2 41 Thus, the application of strict liability to
retailers can be seen as a recognition of safety expectations, but liability is imposed on an enterprise that may not play a direct role in
assuring product safety. From this perspective, the retailer cases
strongly support the doctrine of landlord strict liability. Not only do
tenants have expectations of safety with respect to leased premises,
but unlike many types of retailers landlords can be expected to take
steps to insure the safety of the leased premises.
The difficulty the dissent has in defending its position derives from
the fact that the thrust of the case law of the past quarter century
has been to establish and expand the reach of strict liability. In so
doing, this case law inevitably pointed in the direction of landlord
strict liability.2 42 Indeed, in search of case law to support its position,
the dissent is forced to rely on cases refusing to apply strict liability
to the sale of used machinery. 243 On their face, these cases offer
weak support.244 Landlords seem more similar to lessors of products
than they do to auctioneers of used cranes. In addition, it may be
that the weight of authority in used machinery cases approves of a
strict liability rule,24 although- different standards of defectiveness
may be applied to used, as opposed to new, products.2 46 Moreover,
an examination of the reasoning in the used products cases that have
refused to apply a strict liability rule supports the Becker court's
strict landlord liability rule.
Courts that have been reluctant to impose strict liability on sellers
of used machinery have emphasized the unique nature of markets
for used machinery--"the apparent understanding [is] that the
241. See supra note 238.
242. Ursin, supra note 33, at 837-38 n.82.
243. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 482, 698 P.2d at 135, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
244. The Becker court flatly rejected the defendant's analogy of landlords to dealers in used machinery. 38 Cal. 3d at 466, 698 P.2d at 124, Cal. Rptr. at 221. Landlords,
unlike dealers in used machinery, "have a continuing relationship to the property following renting ...." Id. Unlike the used machinery dealer, the landlord "makes representations of habitability and safety." Id.
245. See, e.g., La Rosa v. Superior Ct., 122 Cal. App. 3d 741, 750, 176 Cal. Rptr.
224, 229 (1981).
246. Id. at 761, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 236.

seller, even though he is in the business of selling such goods, makes
no particular representation about their quality. 24 7 If buyers of used
machinery want assurance of quality, they bargain for it or seek a
dealer who offers it. 248 Generally, however, buyers "are concerned
primarily with price and . . . their expectations as to the quality

[including safety] are consciously reduced. ' ' 249 Moreover, used ma-

chinery cases involve auctioneers "who did not perform any maintenance or repair on the equipment, did not inspect it, and sold it 'as
isi ....

"250

Courts that have refused to apply strict liability in the used machinery cases have been careful to explain how these cases are different from cases involving the leasing of products. 281 These differences
also explain why the machinery cases support landlord strict liability. It has been noted that expectations of safety exist in the case of
leased products that do not exist in the sale of used machinery.252
The "fact that [the lessor of products] offers them repeatedly...
may constitute a representation as to their quality. ' 25 3 Similarly, the
"lessor chooses the products which he offers in a significantly different way than does the typical dealer in used goods .... ,,254 These
observations, of course, also distinguish landlords from used machinery dealers. Finally, unlike used machinery dealers, landlords have a
duty to inspect, maintain and repair the leased premises, and they
have the primary responsibility
for the maintenance of safe, clean
255
and habitable housing.
Issues for Future Consideration
The California Supreme Court in Becker did not limit its holding,
as it might have, to defective products on the leased premises. The
court of appeal decisions of the previous decade-as well as the logic
of strict tort liability-made it clear that landlord strict liability
could not be confined to products. On the other hand, the court's
decision was quite cautious in other respects. The court's precise
holding was that "a landlord engaged in the business of leasing
247. Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 101 Cal. App. 3d 268,
281, 161 Cal. Rptr. 789, 797 (1980) (quoting Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co., 286 Or.
747, 755, 596 P.2d 1299, 1303 (1979)).
248. Id.
249. La Rosa, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 758, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
250. Becker, 38 Cal. 3d at 482, 698 P.2d at 135, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 232 (Lucas, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
251. Tauber-Arons Auctioneers Co., 101 Cal. App. 3d at 276-77, 161 Cal. Rptr.
at 793-94.
252. Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co., 286 Or. 747, 755-56, 596 P.2d 1299, 1304
(1979).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
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dwellings is strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from a latent
defect in the premises when the defect existed at the time the premises were let to the tenant. ' 256 This holding, as well as other aspects
of the Becker decision, raises a number of issues that will have to be
resolved in future decisions.
As an initial matter, it might be noted that Becker involved injury
to a tenant. The question thus might be raised whether landlords are
strictly liable to persons other than tenants who are injured by the
defective condition of the leased premises. It appears clear that the
Becker strict liability holding will not be for the benefit of tenants
only. First, the court's own statement of its holding does not limit its
reach to tenants. 5 In addition, previous decisions by the California
Supreme Court support this conclusion. In Rowland v. Christian258
the court held that the rights of a person injured by an owner or
occupier of land are not determined by the injured person's classification as an invitee, licensee or trespasser. Rowland thus established
a single duty of care, and it is unlikely that the court would consider
resurrecting a classificatory scheme for plaintiffs under a regime of
landlord strict liability. Finally, in the strict products liability context, the court found the case for bystander recovery compelling. In
Elmore v. American Motors Corp.,2 59 it wrote:
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the

consumer or user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably
foreseeable. Consumers and users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect
for defects and to limit their purchases to articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable retailers, whereas the bystander
ordinarily has no such opportunities. In short, the bystander is ingreater
need of protection from defective products which are dangerous, and if any
distinction should be made between bystanders and users, it should be
made, contrary to the position
of defendants, to extend greater liability in
26 0
favor of the bystanders.

By analogy, it would seem that the case for extending the benefits of
strict landlord liability beyond tenants to others injured by the defective condition of the leased premises is compelling.
The Becker court applied strict liability to landlords "engaged in
the business of leasing dwellings. ' 261 Future decisions will have to
define the concept of "in the business of leasing." Becker itself in256. 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
69 Cal. 2d 108, 119, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968).
70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (1969).
Id.
38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 220.

volved a landlord that owned a thirty-six unit apartment complex. It
might be argued that the owner of a single rental unit, such as a
condominium, who regularly leases the unit but owns no other rental
property, is not in the business of leasing in the same sense that the
IRM Corporation is. 26 2 On the other hand, because the condominium owner has made a business judgment as to how to maximize his
investment prospects, receives rent and tax advantages, and may realize appreciation in the value of the property, he might well be seen
as in the business of owning and renting housing. Cofisiderations of
safety and compensation, especially given the availability of liability
insurance, 263 suggest the appropriateness of strict liability. One notes
also that the renter of a single unit, such as an apartment connected
with the landlord's home, will often expect that the landlord himself
has assured the safety of the unit. Furthermore, the burden on the
landlord of safety precautions will be less onerous when only one unit
is involved. Less likely to be found in the business of leasing would
be the homeowner who, for example, occasionally leases his or her
home when taking vacations. In determining which landlords are
"engaged in the business of leasing dwellings," courts will be able to
draw analogies from products cases that have given content to the
concept of lessors "in the business of leasing products. 26 4
The court in Becker held that strict liability is applicable to the
case of a "latent defect in the premises when the defect existed at
the time the premises were let to the tenant."26 5 This statement
raises several issues. One issue is whether strict liability applies to
patent defects, especially where such defects are expressly disclosed
by the landlord at the outset of the lease. In this regard, the court
noted that it did "not determine whether strict liability would apply
to a disclosed defect." 266 The argument against the application of
strict liability in this situation would center on the absence of tenant
safety expectations. The court in Becker wrote that "[a]bsent disclosure of defects, the landlord makes an implied representation that
the premises are fit for use as a dwelling .
1117 It might be ar"...
gued that disclosure would negate any implied representation and
thus any tenant expectations of safety regarding the disclosed defect.
Strict tort liability, it could be argued, is accordingly inappropriate.
On the other hand, safety incentive considerations can be seen to
262. See Love, supra note 3, at 134-35 n.661. It is possible that courts might simply draw an arbitrary line identifying the number of units required for strict liability to
apply, perhaps by analogy to legislative enactments.
263. See supra notes 31-34.
264. See generally Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 178 (1970).
265. 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
266. Id. n.4.
267. Id. at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
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support strict tort liability. As courts have noted, "tenants may often
be financially unable to make repairs . . ." and because "their possession is for a limited term . . . the incentive to make repairs is
significantly less than that of a landlord. ' 26 Compensation and loss
spreading considerations obviously also support strict liability. Moreover, various lines of authority suggest that landlords will not be excused from strict liability in cases of patent and disclosed defects.
Courts have looked with disfavor at attempts of landlords and others
to immunize themselves from judicially-imposed liability. Disclaimers in strict products liability cases have met with disfavor,2 69 as
have lease provisions attempting to exculpate landlords from negligence liability270 or from duties imposed by the implied warranty of
habitability in residential leases.27 l These lines of authority suggest
that mere disclosure of a dangerous defect will not negate landlord
strict tort liability. (They also suggest, of course, that attempts by
landlords to avoid strict liability by exculpatory clauses will be
looked upon unfavorably by courts.) 27 2 Finally, the issue of disclosed
and patent defects in a regime of landlord strict liability can be seen
to resemble the issue of patent defects in strict products liability;
courts have rejected efforts to limit strict products liability to latent,
as opposed to patent, defects.275 The products liability analogy also
suggests, however, that patency and disclosure of defects do have a
bearing on the ultimate issue of landlord liability. While the cause of
action would remain strict liability, a properly circumscribed doctrine of assumption of the risk might provide a defense for landlords,
and the tenant's damages might be reduced under comparative fault
principles.274
Another issue, raised by the Becker court's statement of its holding, stems from the court's reference to defects that "existed at the
268. Putnam v. Stout, 38 N.Y.2d 607, 618, 345 N.E.2d 319, 325, 381 (1965)
N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (1976) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357 comment b).
269. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896
(1964).
270. Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 512, 573 P.2d 465, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1978).
271. See, e.g., Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704 (1974).
272. See Browder, supra note 3, at 143; Love, supra note 3, at 154.
273. See, e.g., Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443 (1972).
274. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 380 (1978) (comparative fault applicable to strict liability). See also Love, supra
note 3, at 155-56.

time the premises were let to the tenant. ' 275 In this regard, the court
expressly noted that "it is unnecessary to determine whether the
landlord is strictly liable for defects in the property which develop
after the property is leased. ' 276 With respect to latent defects that
develop subsequent to the lease, it is unlikely that courts would have
difficulty applying strict liability; there seems no reason to treat this
situation differently from one involving a pre-existing latent defect.2 The difficult case is posed by the patent defect that develops
subsequent to the lease. The case against strict liability in this situation is suggested by the "specter" of applying strict liability to a
landlord who was unaware of a defect, where a tenant was aware of
the defect and failed to alert the landlord to the condition.27 8 "Can a
tenant who sees a defect

. .

. ," it is asked, "be permitted to keep it

to himself and later claim damages . . .[?]29
This line of argument against strict liability is unpersuasive. It is,
in fact, merely a variant of the general argument that landlords who
are 2not
in possession and control should not be subject to strict liability. s0 As we have seen, modern landlord tort and warranty of habitability decisions have rejected this conceptual framework. 28 1 Also,
Becker's strict liability rule recognizes that landlords can be liable
absent notice of a defect, and lack of knowledge of a defect on the
part of a plaintiff is not necessary for strict tort liability. Moreover,
the specter of the tenant who knows of a danger, keeps it to himself,
and later claims damages loses much of its argumentative force
when those who suggest it concede that, in the real world, tenants
have "never been reluctant" to communicate complaints of defects to
landlords. 28 2 Similarly, the argument against strict liability is weakened when it is recognized that landlords commonly retain under the
lease a right to enter to repair.28a More fundamentally, the specter,
when analyzed, suggests not that strict liability is undesirable for
patent defects arising after the premises are let, but rather that de2 84
fenses might exist to the doctrine of strict landlord tort liability.
275. 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
276. Id. at 467 n.5, 698 P.2d at 124 n.5, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 221 n.5.
277. See Browder, supra note 3, at 137-38 (proposing strict liability for defect
unknown to both landlord and tenant; not distinguishing defects arising after lease).
278. Id. at 136-37.
279. Id. at 136.
280. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 81-98.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 55-76 & 90-124.
282. Browder, supra note 3, at 136.
283. Strict Liability in Tort for Latent Defects in Premises, 85 CAL. TORT REP.
155, 156 (L. Sacks & N. Levy eds. 1985).
284. A related specter is that of the tenant not only knowing of the dangerous
condition but creating it by his or her own reckless conduct. Strict liability might be seen
as inappropriate and thus held inapplicable in such cases. Cf. Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H.
87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971) (implied warranty of habitability). Or a defense to
strict liability could be recognized, as suggested infra notes 285-88 and accompanying
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Thus, a failure to give notice to a landlord of a known defect might
bar a tenant's tort cause of action. 8 5 The basis of liability-if notice
was actually given, if reasonable attempts to give notice were made,
or if others injured by the defect brought suit-would properly remain strict liability. 8 8 Moreover, by analogy to products liability decisions, failure to give notice should not in itself be a complete bar to
a tenant's recovery. At most, a tenant's knowledge of a defect (and
lack of notice to the landlord) might suggest the presence of assumption of the risk and might serve merely to reduce the plaintiff's damages through comparative fault. 2 17 The approach to defenses in strict
products liability actions could be easily adapted to the landlord
context:
Defendant's liability for injuries . . . remains strict. The principle of protecting the defenseless is likewise preserved, for plaintiff's recovery will be
reduced only to the extent that his own lack of reasonable care contributed

to his injury. The cost of compensating the victim. . . aibeit proportionally
reduced, remains on defendant . . . and will, through him, be "spread
among society."28

Becker also speaks only of strict liability of landlords who lease
"dwellings." 289 Thus, yet to be decided is the issue of whether strict
liability extends to the lessor of commercial premises, such as an
office building or store. One could argue that strict liability of lessors
of commercial premises necessarily follows from Becker's application
of strict liability to lessors of dwellings. The commercial landlord is
clearly in the business of leasing, and the safety incentive and loss
spreading policies would seem clearly applicable. Yet the commercial lease situation is arguably unlike residential leases in ways that
cut against strict liability. To begin with, the commercial landlord
and tenant are more likely to be in a position of equal bargaining
power than in the residential situation. 290 Expectations of the parties
may thus also differ significantly. Moreover, a commercial
lease-more often than a residential lease-may have a long term,
extending five, ten or more years, with the consequence that landlords have fewer routine opportunities for inspection. The commertext.
285. Love, supra note 3, at 150-53.
286. Id.
287. Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
288. Id. at 737, 575 P.2d at 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87 (emphasis in
original).

289. 38 Cal. 3d at 464, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
290. Cf. Green v. Superior Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1974).

cial tenant may also engage in extensive reconstruction of the premises to fit its particular needs. Where the defective condition arises
because of this reconstruction, the landlord could argue that the defective condition has not arisen out of the "premises" he leased. Nevertheless, when injury does arise out of a defect in the leased premises, the case for strict liability is appealing. This is especially true
when innocent third parties are injured. As between the innocent
third party injured by the defective condition on the premises and
the landlord, the landlord should bear the loss. Application of strict
liability to lessors of commercial property would work little hardship
on such landlords. Liability to third parties and the cost of acquiring
appropriate insurance coverage could be allocated by the lease between the landlord and tenant.
Neither the majority nor the dissent focuses on an important issue
raised by the adoption of strict landlord tort liability: the definition
of "defectiveness" to be used in landlord cases. In some ways this is
not a new issue at all. Courts for the past two decades have been
giving content to the defect concept in strict products liability
cases.2 1' These products liability decisions can be adapted to the
leased premises context when injury is caused by a product that is a
part of the leased premises. That approach to defectiveness can also
be adapted to accidents caused by the physical structure of the
premises itself, just as it would be in the application of strict tort
liability to the sellers of mass-produced homes.2 92 Some cases which
have applied strict liability to the sale of used machinery have suggested that a different standard of defectiveness should be applied to
used, as opposed to new, machinery.293 That approach has questionable validity in the context of leased housing. As the used machinery
cases recognize, a lessor of a product "chooses the product he leases
in a significantly different way than does the typical dealer in used
goods [and] the fact that [the lessor] offers [the product] repeatedly
may constitute a representation as to

. .

.quality . .

,2.
4 Similar

observations apply to landlords and leased dwellings, suggesting the
inappropriateness of a relaxed standard of defectiveness.

291. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1978). See also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (rejecting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)
approach to the defect concept).
292, See, e.g., Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 749 (1969).
293. See La Rosa v. Superior Ct., 122 Cal. App. 3d 741, 176 Cal. Rptr. 224
(1981).
294. Tillman v. Vance Equipment Co., 286 Or. 747, 757, 596 P.2d 1299, 1304
(1979).
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CONCLUSION

The recognition in Becker v. IRM Corp.295 of the doctrine of land-

lord strict tort liability should have been no surprise. More than a
decade of decisions2 96 foreshadowed the California Supreme Court's
decision, and academic commentary had increasingly recognized the
likelihood of this development. 297 The doctrine of landlord strict tort
liability appears surprising only if one focuses narrowly on the issue
of landlord tort liability. Against the backdrop of the traditional law
of landlord and tenant, which so strongly favored landlords, even the
holding in Sargent v. Ross" 8 that landlords owed tenants and others
a full duty of due care seemed a dramatic departure from the past.
Yet this narrow focus distorted reality. The rules of landlord tort
liability are merely one aspect of a multifaceted common law of contract, tort, and property that specifies when one who is injured by
another may receive compensation.
A quarter century prior to Becker, many were surprised when
courts announced the doctrine of strict tort liability for defective
products. 299 Too often, observers had focused narrowly on "tort" law
295. 38 Cal. 3d at 464-65, 698 P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 148-70. California courts have not been
alone in venturing into the realm of landlord strict liability. In 1976, a New York trial
court approved of California's doctrine of strict landlord tort liability and applied it to a
,structural defect. Kaplan v. Coulston, 85 Misc. 2d 745, 381 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1976) (strict
liability when kitchen cabinet fell on plaintiff). In 1981, an appellate court in Hawaii
applied the doctrine in the context of a defective washer/dryer installed as part of a G.E.
Kitchen Center on the leased premises. Boudreau v. General Elec. Co., 2 Hawaii App.
10, 625 P.2d 384 (1981). In Bidar v. AMFAC, Inc., 66 Hawaii 547, 669 P.2d 154
(1983), the Supreme Court of Hawaii refused to hold a hotel owner strictly liable for
injuries caused when a towel bar tore loose from the wall as the elderly plaintiff attempted to use the towel bar to rise from her sitting position on the toilet. Moreover,
Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction, has imposed strict liability on landlords since the early
1800's. LA. CIv. CODE. ANN. arts. 2315-2316, 2322 (West 1971); LA. CIv. CODE ANN.
arts. 670, 2695 (West 1952); Boutte v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 139 La. 945, 72 So.
513 (1916). See also Asper v. Haffley, 458 A.2d 1364 (Pa. Super. 1983) (refusing to
consider strict liability because landlord was not in the business of leasing property).
An early New Jersey appellate court decision, affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, rejected landlord strict liability. Dwyer v. Skyline Apartments, Inc., 123 N.J.
Super. 48, 301 A.2d 463, aff/d 63 N.J. 577, 311 A.2d 1 (1973). See also Young v.
Morrissey, 329 S.E. 2d 426 (S.C. 1985) (rejecting landlord strict liability, quoting Dwyer
extensively). Professor Browder suggests that subsequent New Jersey developments imply
that New Jersey may also be moving toward strict liability. See Browder, supra note 3,
at 149-50. See generally Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980);
Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975).
297. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, at 722; Love, supra note 3, at
130-57; Ursin, supra note 33, at 837-38 n.82.
298. 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973).
299. See Ursin, supra note 2, at 299. Prior to the landmark decisions in Henning167

and had seen tort law through the 1950's as virtually synonymous
with the negligence rule.300 A broader focus, however, would have
revealed that contract law had allowed a warranty cause of action
for personal injury damages in food products cases for some time.30 1
This "warranty" law proved in the 1960's to be a precursor to strict
tort liability for food and other products. A narrow focus on doctrinal categories impeded understanding of these developments. 0 2
Similarly, strict products liability is not a unique and isolated doctrinal development. It is part of a complex web of common law doctrines evolving side-by-side to reflect contemporary conditions and
values. Traditional tort, contract and property law reflected the "felt

necessities" 303 of the nineteenth century, as perceived by the judges
of that era. Holmes in The Common Law could confidently proclaim
that the "general principle of our law is that [the] loss from accident
must lie where it falls . . . .

Today, however, we are not content

with this simple solution to the complex problem of injuries in our
industrial society. Strict products liability is simply one example of
the evolution of the common law toward increased protection of individuals from unexpected risks and hazards. Indeed, as Grant Gilmore has demonstrated, "the expansion of [products liability] is by
no means an isolated development.

.

. ; a comparable expansion of

liability has been going on, notably since 1900, over the whole spectrum of our law of civil obligations, alike in contract and tort." 30 5
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), and Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. (1963), commentators
had frequently simply assumed that strict liability would not apply generally in products
cases. See, e.g., Keeton, ConditionalFault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. REV. 401,
442-43 (1959). This assumption enabled commentators to avoid discussing the merits of
strict products liability. Id. It also precluded them from sensing the monumental changes
that were about to occpr in products liability. Id. In a 1957 symposium discussing
whether strict liability should extend beyond food, only Fleming James argued for such
an extension. See James, General Products-Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 926 (1957). For contrary views, see Green, Should
the Manufacturer of General Products Be Liable Without Negligence?, 24 TENN. L.
REV. 928, 984 (1957); Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers For Injuries Caused By
Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938, 940 (1957); Noel, Manufacturersof Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963, 101718 (1957). In 1960, Prosser approved of the extension beyond food. See Prosser, Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124 (1960).
He wrote, however, that extension beyond products for bodily use "is likely to proceed
.slowly .... After many ... accretions, we may arrive at a 'general rule' of strict
liability for all products, with certain specified exceptions; but these things are still of the
uncertain and indefinite future." Id. at 1139-40.
300. See e.g., Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72, 85 (1942); Seavey, supra note 117, at 375.
301. See, e.g., Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E.
105 (1931).
302. See supra notes 299-300.
303. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 117, at 5.
304. Id. at 76.
305. Gilmore, Products Liability: A Commentary, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 103, 111
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During this period, "the legal rules and doctrines which successfully
immunized actors or enterprisers from liability have been in the process of breakdown." 30 6
These common law developments obviously have not occurred in a
vacuum. Rather, they mirror broader societal changes. During the
nineteenth century, economic conditions, the perceived needs of industrialization, and the values of individualism 0 7 may have supported the view that losses from accidents must lie where they fall. 308
During the twentieth century, in contrast, we have increasingly become a society that seeks to protect its members from unexpected
catastrophes. This century has seen a proliferation of programs and
plans aimed at affording this protection. Various forms of health,
disability, liability and other insurance have bloomed. Similarly, legislative enactments, dating back to the turn of the century, have included workers' compensation, social security, compulsory automobile liability insurance, Medicare, and no-fault automobile plans.
Although hardly a comprehensive system, these programs demonstrate a commitment to provide compensation to protect individuals
from the overwhelming economic loss that may be occasioned by vicissitudes of life such as accident, old age, sickness and unemployment. 309 The growth of strict liability, as well as the expansion of
tort and civil liability generally, is "part and parcel of [this] great
shift" in societal values. 310
Landlords have been unable to escape this process of modernization by taking refuge behind once sacrosanct rules of property law.
Indeed, tenants were first afforded greater rights by the judicial application of principles of modern contract law to leases-most nota(1970).
306. Id. at 112.
307. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 410 (1973); M. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA 1760-1860, at 85-99 (1977). See also W. NELSON,
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 1760-1830, at 144 (1975). Some scholars have
emphasized the link between industrialization and tort law less than others. See, e.g., E.
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 3 (1980). While it is clear that goals other than economic growth also shaped the development of nineteenth-century tort law, the perceived
desirability of economic growth was a dominant value of that era and was reflected in the
law. See J.W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTHCENTURY UNITED STATES 19 (1956). For a recent contribution to the literature, see

Rabin, The HistoricalInterpretationof the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation,15 GA.
L. REV. 925 (1981). See also supra note 116.
308. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 117, at 76.
309. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 31, at 759.
310. Gilmore, supra note 305, at 115. See generally R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY &
H. KALVEN, supra note 27, at xxii-xxxiii; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965).

bly in the recognition of the implied warranty of habitability.311
, Yet
these same contract principles of warranty law had already been
transformed by courts into the doctrine of strict tort liability when
personal injury was caused by a defective product.312 That this strict
liability rule might eventually be applied to landlords was clearly
implied by the warranty of habitability cases which had emphasized
that "public policy compels landlords to bear the primary responsibility for maintaining safe, clean, and habitable housing ....
Writing two decades ago-just two years after his court's landmark
adoption of strict products liability 3 4-Chief Justice Traynor clearly
stated his view of the future of tort law: "The development of strict
liability for defective products . . . presages the abandonment of

long standing concepts of fault in accident cases. The significant innovations in products liability may well be carried over to such
cases. ''31 5 Becker's application of strict tort liability to landlords confirms the accuracy of Justice Traynor's prediction and is a logical
consequence of the evolution of the law of tort, contract, and property over the past decades.

311. Green, l0 Cal. 3d at 629, 517 P.2d at 1176, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
312. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 57, 377 P.2d at 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 697. See
Henningsen, 32 N.J. at 358, 161 A.2d at 69.
313. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
314. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 57, 377 P.2d at 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. .at 697.
315. Traynor, supra note 310, at 375.

